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ESSAY

"I ENTERED DURING THE DAY, AND CAME OUT DURING
THE NIGHT": POWER, ENVIRONMENT, AND INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES IN A GLOBALIZING PANAMA

Osvaldo Jordan*
For months now, the widow has clung to her tiny
shack in this picturesque village above the Changuinola River-even when local officials and hydroelectric workers said she must leave, even
when a bulldozer roared into her yard in the summer. "I will not go," insists Isabel Becker, 59, a
diminutive Ngobe Indian who lives in a dirtfloored home. "If the company wants to send police to kill me, go ahead."'

The story of the Ngobe widow Isabel Becker, living
in the Province of Bocas del Toro in Northwestern Panama,
who entered at mid-day to an unknown business tower in
Panama City, and was not able to leave that building until
mid-night, may easily be interpreted as yet another of
countless cases of local indigenous women being abused by
the mighty power of corrupt governments and multinational
corporations. For the casual observer, the same plot could
be laid out in almost any country in the humid tropics:
Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Brazil or Guatemala. Yet,
under the surface of what Paul Farmer (2004) has called the

* Alianza para la Conservacion y el Desarrollo (ACD), Republic of
Panama (Alliance for Conservation and Development (ACD), Republic
of Panama).
Ben Shors, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 2, 2007.
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"ethnographically visible, ' 2 we can discover that the drama
of Isabel is not simply an archetype of the continuous tragedy of indigenous peoples, but instead a reflection of a
complex web of social relations, embedded in and creating
of the legal framework of a national state that is simultaneously global and parochial, liberalized and oppressive, the
booming Panama of the XXI century without the welfare
state that sought for the protection of the Ngobe regime of
defacto political autonomy in the 1970s.
Under this light, the story of Isabel is not yet another tragedy of any indigenous widow in a Third World
country. Instead, the destiny of Isabel is an open-ended
question about the place of the Ngobe womb in a globalizing economy, a question that demands a definitive answer
from all of those who participate in this continuous struggle
for power. In spite of the celebrated legal victories of indigenous peoples in Latin America, the case of Panama
reveals a number of disturbing questions about the persistence of colonial relations between indigenous peoples and
the descendants of the colonizers. The widow Isabel
Becker appears not to have any place in a globalizing Panama of skyscrapers, beach resorts, and expanded waterways.
I. Changing citizen regimes in Latin America
The end of the Cold War prefigured profound transformations in Latin American societies. With the legacy of
a code-based legal system, and what many observers would
call the burden of patriarchal, Catholic authoritarianism,
every Latin American country, with the possible exception
of Cuba, embarked upon a double transition from statecontrol into market economics, and from top-down authoritarian rule into liberal democracy in the 1990s. Inimical to
2 Paul Farmer, An Anthropology Of StructuralViolence,
CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY 45 (2004), at 305.
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this "modernization" of Latin American society was the
dismantling of those corporatist structures that maintained
an ingrained intertwining of state and society. 3 The marriage between popular organizations and centralized governments, allegedly based on class distinctions, was
expected to recede in the wake of free enterprise and equal
citizenship. State companies should be disaggregated and
sold to private investors who would not only bring new
technology and capital investment, but improve efficiency
and overall customer satisfaction. In general, the structural
(and social) adjustment of the Latin American economies
was associated with lifting restrictions against private initiative and individual accomplishment.
In spite of this Washington Consensus that promised citizen equality and personal liberty, many social scientists perceived an unexpected rise of assertive "new"
indigenous movements that emerged from the foundations
of previous class-based organizations, such as peasant leagues and worker unions.4 The 1990 Ecuadorian "General
Uprising" and the Bolivian "March to La Paz" symbolized
the arrival of these new social movements of a postmodern
Latin America, the expression of suppressed identities that
had been sequestered by leftist guerrillas and Marxist intellectuals many years before. 5 Under this scenario, the legal
3 DONNA LEE VAN COTT, THE FRIENDLY LIQUIDATION OF THE PAST:
THE POLITICS OF DIVERSITY IN LATIN AMERICA 3 (2000); Willem

Assies, Indigenous Peoples and Reform of the State in Latin America,
in THE CHALLENGE OF DIVERSITY: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE
REFORM OF THE STATE IN LATIN AMERICA 9-10 (Willem Assies, Gemma van der Haar & Andre Hoekema eds., 2000); DEBORAH YASHAR,
CONTESTING CITIZENSHIP IN LATIN AMERICA: THE RISE OF INDIGENOUS
MOVEMENTS AND THE POST LIBERAL CHALLENGE 65-66 (2005).

4 Xavier Albo, 9 El Retorno del Indio Revista Andina 299-345 (1991).
5Kay B. Warren, Indigenous Movements as a Challenge to the Unified

Social Movement Paradigmfor Guatemala, in CULTURE

OF POLITICS,

POLITICS OF CULTURE: RE-VISIONING LATIN AMERICAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 165-66 (Sonia Alvarez, Evelina D'Agnino & Arturo Escobar

eds., 1998).
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recognition of special indigenous rights in several Latin
American constitutional reforms-Nicaragua (1987), Brazil
(1988), Colombia (1991), Ecuador (1998), Venezuela
(1999)-was regarded as a major victory against the legal
barriers that separated the
descendants of the colonists from
6
those of the colonizers.
These new multicultural citizenship regimes granted
special rights to indigenous peoples and Afro-Descendants
without compromising the liberal principle of citizen equality and the sovereignty of the State.7 Special indigenous
rights should be acknowledged based on the historical
claims of indigenous peoples (and in some cases Afrodescendants). Although not all of the Latin American
countries adopted multicultural citizenship regimes, constitutional reforms at the national level were also paralleled
by the development of an international regime of indigenous rights, beginning with the enactment of ILO 169 and
culminating with the 2007 United Nations Declaration on
Indigenous Peoples. 8 Even when national legislation did
not explicitly recognize the rights of indigenous peoples,
international human rights legislation bolstered their claims
for territory and autonomy, as was demonstrated by the
decisions adopted by the Inter-American Human Rights
Court in favor of the Mayangna of Awas Tingni in Nicaragua and the Saramaka in Surinam. Even the World Bank
and the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB),
harshly criticized and held responsible for the plight of
indigenous peoples in the 1970s, officially recognized indigenous rights and enacted special guidelines for the pro6See generally COTT, supra note 3; Assies, supra note 3; YASHAR,

supra note 3.

7 See generally WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP:
LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995).
8INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA
6-8

A

(Donna Lee Van Cott ed., 1994); see generally ALLISON BRYSK, FROM
TRIBAL VILLAGE TO GLOBAL VILLAGE: INDIAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA (2000).
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tection of indigenous peoples in their development initiatives. 9 In legal terms, the multicultural revolution had been
launched, and the new legislation promised to build a new
framework for both citizen equality and cultural tolerance
in Latin America.
In spite of the optimism of the 1990s, other social
scientists have questioned the extent and the intent of multicultural reforms in the context of neo-liberal government
policies.' 0 According to Hale, what he called neoliberal
multiculturalism is not only an incomplete response to
racial discrimination and social exclusion, but may actually
hinder the development of more ambitious initiatives, imposing the terms of participation and suppressing the expression of what would be called "extreme" opinions."l
According to Diaz Polanco, multiculturalism is inimical to
the construction of a global empire, in which the other is
not only embraced, but refashioned by the forces of global
capitalism.1 2 As a new dawn of constitutional reforms
extends through Latin America, indigenous peoples and
their advocates are seriously questioning the capacity of
multicultural citizenship regimes to accommodate ethnicity

9 See generally JONATHAN A. Fox & L. DAVID BROWN, THE STRUGGLE
FOR ACCOUNTABILITY: WORLD BANK, NGOs, AND GRASSROOTS
MOVEMENTS

(1998).

10See generally Charles Hale, Does Multiculturalism menace? Governance, CulturalRights and the Politicsof Identity in Guatemala, 34
JOURNAL OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES 485-524 (2002); Otero Gerardo
& Heidi Jugenitz, ChallengingNationalBordersfrom Within: The
Political-ClassFormationof Indigenous Peasants in Latin America, 40
CANADIAN REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY

504-24

(2003); Otero Gerardo, Global Economy, Local Politics:Indigenous
Struggles, Civil Society, and Democracy, 37 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE 325-47 (2004); HECTOR DIAZ-POLANCO, EL LA-

BERINTO DE LA IDENTIDAD 23-56 (2006).

"1Hale, supranote 10, at 485-524.
12 DIAZ-POLANCO,

supra note 10, at 23-56 (2006).
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or what
beyond the confines of mere cultural difference
13
multiculturalism."
"boutique
labeled
Stanley Fish
II. Puente del Mundo y Corazon del Universo
Although Panama has never officially recognized
multicultural citizenship in the National Constitution, the
country has historically been heralded as a pioneer of indigenous political autonomy in Latin America. With no
powerful landed oligarchy submitting the native masses to
coerced labor, the staunchly Liberal Panamanian merchant
elite-the same that wore British outfits in the mid-XIX
century-advocated for equal opportunities for whoever
capitalized the advantages that were provided by the cosmopolitan inter-oceanic passageway-Jewish, Chinese,
Hindu, or Italian immigrants, they would all be welcomed
in this land of unfettered opportunities. 14 In this respect,
why should Panama be declared multicultural, like Nicaragua or Ecuador, if the country was by its very "nature"
open to people of all "races," faiths, and ideologies? In an
intrinsically multicultural Panama, indigenous peoples and
Afro-descendants, like European and Asian migrants,
would all possess a comer in this crossroads of the world.
No other time was this national myth more eloquently expressed than in the heated election for the presidency of the
National Assembly in September 1999, when the new fe13Stanley Fish, Boutique Multiculturalism,or Why Liberals are Inca-

pable of Thinking about Hate Speech, 23 CRITICAL INQUIRY 378-95
(1997).
14For a historical account of the development of Liberal cosmopolitanism as a dominant ideology in Panama, see ALFREDO FIGUEROANAVARRO, DOMINIO Y SOCIEDAD EN EL PANAMA COLOMBIANO (1821-

1903): ESCRUTINIO SOCIOLOGICO 215-22 (Editorial Universitaria
1982); PETER SZOK, LA ULTIMA GAVIOTA: LIBERALISM AND NOSTALGIA IN EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY PANAMA 13-34 (2001); AIMs
MCGUINNESS, PATH OF EMPIRE: PANAMA AND THE CALIFORNIA GOLD

RUSH 84-7 (2008).
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male President Mireya Moscoso eagerly awaited the results
of the election between Afro-descendant Haydee Milanes
de Lay from Darien and Kuna indigenous legislator Enrique Garrido from San Blas. Regardless of the final outcome favoring Garrido, Panama had accomplished its
ultimate destiny as a country of equal opportunities
for
5
people of all racial and ethnic backgrounds.'
With such a cohesive national myth, Panamanians
have avoided explaining the virulent nationalism of the
1930s; the continued conflict between cattle ranchers and
Ngobe indigenous peoples in Western Panama; and the
Kuna insurrection of 1925, among other instances of ethnic
conflict. 16 In particular, the Kuna insurrection of 1925 has
been reinvented to signify the creation of an innovative
Panamanian regime of indigenous political autonomy, and
not as the violent reaction of indigenous peoples against the

imposition of colonial rule by an assertive national state.
The armed insurrection of indigenous leader Victoriano
Lorenzo between 1899 and 1902 has also been transformed
by nationalist writers into a "peasant" struggle against Colombian political domination. In spite of all the historical
15

The whole story was revisited by the Panamanian daily El Siglo on

September 4, 2008. This newspaper reproduced the declarations of
Haydee Milanes de Lay just a few days before the primary elections of
the Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD). On September 7, Balbina
Herrera, whom Milanes de Lay had accused of bribing her to become
the nominee for the presidency of the National Assembly in 1999,
received the majority of the party votes to become the PRD presidential
candidate for the upcoming general elections in May 2009.
16 See Francisco Herrera, The State-Indian Relations in Panama, 19031983 88-89 (Masters Thesis, University of Florida, 1989) (referencing
the historical conflict between cattle ranchers and Ngobe indigenous
peoples); THOMAS PEARCY, WE ANSWER ONLY TO GOD: POLITICS AND

THE MILITARY IN PANAMA, 1903-1947 88-89 (1998) (discussing the

institutionalization of discriminator practices against West Indians,
Middle Easterners, and East Asians); SZOK, supra note 14, at 110-14
(2001); JAMES HOWE, A PEOPLE WHO WOULD NOT KNEEL: PANAMA,
THE UNITED SATES, AND THE SAN BLAS KUNA (1998) (discussing the

Kuna Insurrection of 1925).
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evidence supporting the claim that ethnic relations have
been replete with different levels of political conflict in
Panama, the hegemonic discourse of innate multiculturalism has permeated all layers of society, concealing a deeply
skewed distribution of income in which indigenous peoples
comprise the majority of the poor.
This historical legacy of uneven wealth distribution,
that was associated with class, race and ethnicity, began
fracturing the Panamanian political system in the 1960s,
auguring an increased mobilization of indigenous peoples,
peasant leagues, labor unions, student federations, and
other popular organizations in the coming years. 17 In 1965,
the proclamation of an independent Ngobe republic by the
leaders of the Mama Tata revival movement reflected the
malaise that plagued the country, only a year after student
protestors had been massacred by US armed forces in the
Canal Zone. 18 Like Isabel Becker of Charco de La Pava,
the Prophet of Mama Tata, Delia Bejarano, was a Ngobe
woman who was trying to draw the map of her own destiny. According to anthropologist Guionneau-Sinclair, she
had recently left the banana plantations of Pacific Western
Panama after many Ngobe labor organizers had been fired
by the Chiriqui Land Company, a subsidiary of the United
Fruit Company. An isolationist spiritual movement that
was at the same time critical of the Ngobe traditions of
poligamy, chicha'9 drinking and ritualized fighting, 20 Ma17 GEORGE PRIESTLEY, MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN PANAMA: THE TORRIJOS REGIMES,

1968-1985 21-26

(1986).
18FRANCOISE GUIONNEAU-SINCLAIR, MOVIMIENTO PROFETICO E INNOVACION POLITICA ENTRE LOS NGOBE (GUAYMI) DE PANAMA, 1962-

1984 74-125 (1988).
19 The term chicha refers to a variety of fermented drinks that are used
by indigenous peoples in Latin America.
20 The Ngobe tradition of ritualized fighting, or balseria, was
the most
important trans-kinship ceremony before the advent of the Mama Tata
movement in the 1960s. For a complete ethnography of this cultural
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ma Tata called for the separation of the Ngobe from the
corruption of Spanish-speaking society. For this reason,
this movement sparked the political mobilization of the
Ngobe who had been claiming for the legal recognition of
their territorial rights during many years. After the unexpected death of the prophet in 1964, and the declaration of
an independent Ngobe republic by her followers a few
months later, the State response was the dispatch of a National Guard unit to the Ngobe territory under the command
of Mayor Omar Torrijos Herrera. Here the official account
of Guionneau-Sinclair presented an unexpected turn of
events. Mayor Torrijos refused to repress the Ngobe protesters and fostered a dialogue with the indigenous leaders,
who eventually decided to recognize Panamanian sovereignty. Had Torrijos not become the "supreme leader" of
Panama four years later, the overarching implications of
this episode would have probably not only been forgotten,
but grossly underestimated.
III.

The Corporatist Legacy of the Torrijos Dictatorship

After an internal quarrel within the National Guard,
Omar Torrijos Herrera emerged as the main leader of the
so-called 1968 revolutionary process. 21 Like Velasco Alvarado in Peru, Torrijos redefined the contours of the State
relations with indigenous peoples.22 The persistence of
indigenous territorial rights was formally recognized in the
practice,

see PHILIP YOUNG, NGAWBE: TRADITION AND CHANGE

AMONG THE WESTERN GUAYMI OF PANAMA 204-12 (1971).
21 STEVE RoPP, PANAMANIAN POLITICS: FROM GUARDED NATION TO
NATIONAL GUARD 38-41 (1982); PRIESTLEY, supra note 17, at 26-27;
WALTER LAFEBER, THE PANAMA CANAL: THE CRISIS IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 125-27 (1989); CARLOS GUEVARA-MANN, PANAMANIAN
MILITARISM: A HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION
22 Herrera, supra note 16, at 94-99.

106-09 (1996).
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1972 Constitution, and the Kuna exception was adopted as
a national model of political autonomy. Torrijos committed
himself to the creation of comarcas for the protection of the
collective lands of all indigenous groups in the country.
The personal, direct and even occasionally affectionate
relations between Torrijos and several of the main indigenous leaders have been recorded in numerous anecdotes of
real or imaginary encounters between Torrijos and these
ethnic leaders. As controversial of a figure as Torrijos was,
both a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize and at the same
time accused of human rights violations; after the 1981
plane crash in which he prematurely died, it would be impossible to decipher his real intentions for developing such
a close association with indigenous leaders.
As the head of a military dictatorship, Torrijos was
reputed for declaring that he was not with the Left nor with
the Right, but with the Panamanian people. As a result, the
Torrijos government was composed of the most disparate
characters that anybody could ever imagine, from a US
educated and later to become Vice-President of the World
Bank, Nicolas Ardito Barletta, to some of the most renowned communist intellectuals in the country. The eclecticism of the Torrijos coalition reflected both its intent, and
its inherent contradiction. The General tried to create a
powerful State that would incorporate all different sectors
of society into a common struggle for national liberation
and economic development. He came to practice what has
been referred as corporatism in Latin America, ruling in
response to organized groups both created and submissive
to the national government. Under this model, the interests
of indigenous peoples would be incorporated into state
decisions, yet indigenous peoples would never be expected
to act independently of government-defined national interests. In this regard, the indigenous, and other corporate
interests, would always be considered secondary to the
principal goal of recovering the Canal Zone from the control of the United States. In the same token, the Canal Zone

10
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would be visualized as a national public good for the benefit of all Panamanians without any distinctions-the golden
cup that was lost for many years and that would produce
wealth for the rest of the country.
After the approval of the Panama Canal treaties in
1977, the second phase of the Torrijos government could be
implemented, integrating the national territory into a coherent organic entity, in which all groups would contribute and
receive benefits from the inter-oceanic passageway.23 Indigenous peoples were certainly the poorest among all
Panamanians, yet their territories were loaded with valuable
natural resources that could be harvested for the welfare of
the country. Timber, water resources for oil-free energy,
and precious metals were all present in the Naso, Ngobe,
Kuna, and Embera territories. Loyal to his promise, Torrijos would not demand the indigenous peoples to relinquish
their lands using the threat of government repression. Instead, he directed his state bureaucracy towards the formal
recognition of indigenous territorial rights through the
creation of comarcas; yet he also expected that the indigenous peoples would contribute to the wealth of the nation
by offering their natural resources. Apparently, Torrijos
was not aware of the inherent contradiction of the policies
that he was promoting, that once indigenous peoples were
empowered and entitled to their lands, they would also be
free to make their own decisions about the use of their
natural resources, even against the alleged benefit of the
rest of the country.
The bargaining approach promoted by the Dictadura con Carino24 of Omar Torrijos led to the signing of
the Farallon Accords, in which the Kuna of Bayano ac23

Herrera, supra note 16, at 107; ALAKA WALI, KILOWATTS AND

CRI-

SIS: HYDROELECTRIC POWER AND SOCIAL DISLOCATION 16-17 (1989);
CHRIS GJORDING, CONDITIONS NOT OF THEIR CHOOSING: THE GUAYMI
INDIANS AND MINING MULTINATIONALS IN PANAMA 31-35 (1991).
24 "Dictatorship with Love"
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cepted that their ancestral lands be flooded for the construction of the Bayano hydroelectric project in Eastern Panama.25 In compensation for this extraordinary sacrifice,
the State would provide the Kuna with health facilities and
potable water; and would protect the existing forests for the
Kuna to maintain their traditional culture and to continue
with their subsistence economy. We would never know
what the fate would have been of the Torrijos corporatist
model of indigenous participation had his author survived
into the 1980s; yet the future tensions that would be generated by this regime of corporatist citizenship were subsumed by the spontaneous expression of a Kuna woman
during a meeting about the Bayano negotiations: "Acaso
Usted es Dios para prometer tanto" (Franciso Herrera
personal communication). No new indigenous comarcas
were created during the lifespan of Torrijos, and after his
death, all the internal contradictions of his revolutionary
movement, and all the disparate forces that had been subtly
repressed by his military corporatism emerged with sufficient pressure to confront indigenous peoples against the
government bureaucracy of the Revolutionary Democratic
Party (PRD). 26
IV.

A Struggle for Power: Indigenous Peoples
against the Revolutionary Process

After the death of Omar Torrijos, his successors
inherited many promises that were difficult to fulfill. Torrijos had committed his government with the Embera, the
25

WALI,

supra note 23, at 81-84; Stephanie Wickstrom, The Politics of

Development in Indigenous Panama,30 LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 48-49 (2003); Lynn Horton, ContestingState Multiculturalisms:
Indigenous Land Struggles in Eastern Panama,38 JOURNAL OF LATIN
AMERICAN
STUDIES 838-39 (2006).
26

The Revolutionary Democratic Party, or PRD, was created by Omar
Torrijos himself in 1978 as part of the democratic opening that followed the signing of the Panama Canal treaties.
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Ngobe, the Bugle and the Naso for the creation of new
comarcas; yet he had also embarked the country into a
course of development that would demand the same land,
energy and mining resources that were contained in the
indigenous territories. 27 During the first years after the
death of Torrijos, the bureaucracy of the Revolutionary
Democratic Party (PRD) 28 engaged in simultaneous negotiations with the different indigenous groups for the creation of their comarcas and to obtain their approval for
development projects. However, government officials soon
encountered Ngobe opposition to the construction of hydroelectric projects in Tabasara and Teribe-Changuinola,
and to the exploitation of the Cerro Colorado mines, located in the heart of the Ngobe Territory. As negotiations
with the Ngobe stalled, the Government was only able to
proceed with the creation of the Embera-Wounaan Indigenous Comarca in 1982.
The Ngobe negotiations collapsed in 1983 after
unsolvable disagreements about the continuation of the
Cerro Colarado mines and the limits of the comarca in the
Veraguas region. 29 The failure of the negotiations coincided with a period of increasing turmoil in Panama, as the
country approximated to the first direct general elections
since 1968. General Manuel Antonio Noriega had defeated
his main political opponents within the military, and was
27

John Bort & Mary Helms (eds.), Panamain Transition:Local Reac-

tions to Development Policies. Museum of Anthropology, University
WALI, supra note 23, at 16-17;
GJORD1NG, supranote 23 at, 31-35.
28 Although there were high-ranking government officials involved in
these negotiations, I have chosen to use the term bureaucracy to refer to
all of them, since they were all part of a whole generation of Panamanian civilians who had developed their careers with the support of the
military, and who typically occupied different positions in government
service until the end of the "revolutionary process" with the US Invasion in 1989. During this entire period, actual political power resided
in the hands of the military.
29 Herrera, supra note 16, at 113-15.

of Missouri, Columbia 3-16 (1983);
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prepared for seizing control of the government in favor of
his candidate, former head of the World Bank for Latin

America, Nicolas Ardito Barletta. 30 In fact, the revolutionary process had continued a decisive movement to the right
that started during the last years of Torrijos. In spite of the
boisterous populism of the military regime, the Generals
were fully aware that Panama would soon have to implement the structural adjustment measures of the Washington
Consensus, in order to salvage the indebted economy that
they had inherited from the pharaohnic projects of the
1970s.
Rather than preparing the stage for a controlled
transition to civilian rule, the 1984 elections initiated a
period of profound political instability as news spread that
the elections had been rigged by the military. 31 Although
the first structural adjustment package was eventually defeated when popular mobilizations appealed to the legacy
of social conquests bequeathed by the military; the internal
quarrel within the rank and files of the PRD further debilitated the legitimacy of the government. Combined with the
burden of the debt crisis, this crisis of governance foreclosed any possibility of discussing the issue of the indigenous comarcas, and delayed even the promotion of the
ambitious national development agenda of the 1970s, that
included roads, dams and mining complex. During this
period, however, the increasing participation of a new generation of Westerly-educated indigenous leaders in the
ranks and files of the PRD, reinforced the corporatist structures that had been laid out by Torrijos and his leftist supporters - also called La Tendencia.32 As the power of the
military was eroded by brutal repression and accusations of
corruption, most indigenous leaders remained loyal to the
30 LAFEBER, supra note 21, at 194-97.
3' Id. at 196-98.

32 La Tendencia referred to a group of PRD members who identified
themselves with Marxism-Leninism and other leftist tendencies.
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revolutionary process, hoping that the protection of their
collective lands would be achieved through the creation of
comarcas. In spite of all the unresolved controversies
about the use of natural resources, these indigenous leaders
assumed that the corporatist agenda would be resumed once
the crisis with the United States was finally resolved. The
onset of the American intervention to oust Noriega in 1989,
however, did not lead to a new coalition between the government and indigenous peoples, but instead to a complete
reinvention of the Panamanian state along the lines of privatization and individualism. The odds were thrown
against the continuation of any form of defacto indigenous
political autonomy, and in favor of the private exploitation
of natural resources by international corporations.
V.

Indigenous Comarcas and Development Projects in the New Liberal Era

The phantom of structural adjustment resurfaced
after the US Marines began leaving a war-torn and devastated Panama in 1990. The claims of PRD anti-imperialists
were absolutely confirmed as they battled against the economic reform package of the first Minister of Economic
Planning of the new democratic period, Guillermo Ford;
and against George Bush himself during his infamous visit
to Panama City in 1992. 33 Apparently, the party of the
people was not willing to sanction the dismantling of the
Torrijos legacy of corporatist governance, and was opposed
to what they called the return of the oligarchic rule that had
dominated the country before the 1960s. In this context,
indigenous peoples resumed their political mobilizations,
33 See Michael Wines, THE NEW YORK TIMES, June 13, 1992 (noting

that George Bush made a stop in Panama on his way to the Earth
Summit in Rio de Janeiro. He was greeted by large demonstrations, in
which prominent PRD figures protested in the streets against the 1989
U.S. occupation, including presidential candidate for the upcoming
2009 general elections, Balbina Herrera).
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once again demanding the legal recognition of their territorial rights. In 1993, the Governor of Panama province was
held by the Kuna of Bayano, who claimed for the fulfillment of the Farallon Accords and for the creation of their
comarca seventeen years after their lands had been flooded
by the rise of the Bayano reservoir. 34 Faced with widespread opposition at many different fronts, the postwar
government of Guillermo Endara adopted a conservative
stance-the implementation of the Washington Consensus
would only be advanced until the limits imposed by the
political and social instability that had been left in the country by the US military action.
Paradoxically, and reminiscent of similar developments in Peru, Argentina, Bolivia and Mexico in the 1980s
and 1990s; the party of the Torrijos Revolution, the PRD,
inherited the mission to implement structural adjustment
policies, and so they did with unexpected fervor. The new
President Ernesto Perez Balladares was commissioned with
the daunting task of lifting the PRD out of the ashes of the
US invasion. A former banker, minister of economy and
Noriega rival, Perez Balladares moved the pendulum away

from military corporatism and into what he called the
"modernization" of the Panamanian economy. Under the
neo-liberal reforms, the promises of Torrijos to the Bayano
Kuna were completely buried, as the Bayano Corporation
was abolished, public utilities were privatized, and the
former Directory of Community Development was eliminated. Even the Ministry of Economic Planning was transformed into the Ministry of Economy, signaling the
disappearance of the welfare state of centralized planning
and state protagonism in national development.
As a well-educated adherent to neo-liberalism,
Perez Balladares, however, understood that private investment required the creation of regulating institutions, like

34 Horton, supra note 25, at 842-43.

16

4:2 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 483

the Ente Regulador de los Servicios Publicos (ERSP) 35 and
the Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente (ANAM), 6 that
would ensure free competition, citizen rights and business
accountability.
These moderating reforms, however,
lagged behind the rapid elimination of government-owned
corporations. Worried about the future of their collective
lands in the midst of the private allocation of natural resources, the Ngobe and the Bayano Kuna increased their
mobilization, which ultimately led to the creation of their
respective comarcas through Law 10 of 1997 and Law 24
of 1996, respectively. How would these autonomous regimes fare in an era of private investment and deregulation?
The creation of the Ngobe-Bugle 37 and the Madungandi 38 comarcas during the Perez Balladares administration revealed the contested legacy of the Torrijos
corporatist model. The same party that had defended national sovereignty and the incorporation of the marginalized populations in the 1970s had now dismantled public
corporations and set the stage for the arrival of new private
actors. In compensation for the Torrijos promises, or perhaps as a recourse to demobilize the indigenous population,
35 The Ente Regulador de los Servicios Publicos (ERSP), or Public

Services Regulatory Entity, was created through Law 26 of 1996 and
became responsible for concessioning the provision of national public
services like electricity and telephone and for protecting customers
against
the potential abuses of private corporations.
36
The Autoridad Nacional del Ambiente (ANAM), or National Environmental Authority, was created by Law 41 of 1998, and became
responsible for approving environmental impact assessments, enforcing
environmental norms, and granting concessions for the use of natural
resources, such as timber and water resources.
37 The Bugle is a very small indigenous group (<10,000) with strong
cultural affinities with the Ngobe. Therefore, they decided to conform
a single comarca with the Ngobe. A similar request was turned down
by another indigenous group, the Naso.
38 The Bayano Kuna comarca was officially denominated Comarca
Indigena Kuna de Madungandi.
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Perez Balladares had paid the historical debt to the Ngobe
and the Bayano Kuna with the creation of the comarcas.
However, his government had also ensured that article 48
of Law 10 of 1997 would limit the autonomy of the Ngobe
by denying their right to decide on the use of natural resources; and that article 21 of Law 24 of 1996 guaranteed
the user rights of the non-indigenous colonists that had
invaded the Kuna lands after the construction of the Bayano hydroelectric project. Instead of receiving an unrestricted support from the party of the Revolution,
indigenous leaders were forced to negotiate the terms of
their political autonomy; and many indigenous leaders
unrelentingly accepted these compromises as members of
the PRD government party. Such a contradiction revealed
the inherent limitations imposed by the corporatist model of
citizenship. In the 1970s, indigenous peoples were considered part of the Revolution and supporters of the anticolonial struggles intimately associated with the welfare
state of Omar Torrijos; yet in the 1990s they would be
auctioned to the best bidder during the process of privatization.
The creation of the Kuna Comarca of Wargandi in
2000 by the new presidential administration of Mireya
Moscoso (1999-2004), precisely during the congressional
presidency of the Kuna legislator Enrique Garrido, marked
the epitaph of the alliance between the government and
indigenous peoples. In spite of all the implicit references to
multiculturalism during the inauguration of Mireya Moscoso, the aspirations of indigenous peoples conflicted with the
projections of government officials for economic growth
and national development. The development of hydroelectric infrastructure throughout the country, under a new
modality of private investment, represented a direct threat
to the integrity of indigenous territories and to the worldview of indigenous peoples. The course of collusion of the
1970s had become the road to collision in the 1990s, and
the future of Isabel Becker and many other Ngobe widows
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would be pending on the unavoidable confrontation between the capitalist logic of a renewed state bureaucracy
and the resistance position of indigenous communities. In
this process of dissociation, indigenous leaders who had
initiated their political careers hands in hands with the
Torrijos corporatist model of citizenship would be captured
by their double loyalties, exposed and discredited in the
face of growing grassroots opposition to the privatization of
their indigenous territories.
VI.

The Bonyic Hydroelectric Project and the
Unfulfilled Promise of the Naso Comarca

Although the Ngobe and the Bayano Kuna comarca
negotiations dominated most of the government discussions
and media coverage about indigenous issues during the
1980s and 1990s; most Panamanian citizens ignored the
existence of another group of distinct indigenous peoples
living close to the border between Panama and Costa Rica,
the Naso (also called Teribe in Panama and Terraba in
Costa Rica). Before the Mizkitu invasions of the XVIII
century, the Naso had constituted the most numerous indigenous group living in what today is the Caribbean Province of Bocas del Toro in Northwestern Panama. Their
historical territory, and their ferocious resistance against the
Spanish colonization, had been avidly recorded by the
Franciscan missionaries that had traveled from Costa Rica
to evangelize this frontier. 39 Possibly for multiple reasons
that have never been properly investigated, the Naso population declined drastically; and their substantial demographic recovery was not possible until the mid-twentieth
39

For infomation about the colonial history of the Naso, see Fernandez-Guardia, Ricardo 1969 Resena Historicade Talamanca. Imprenta Nacional, San Jose, Costa Rico; BURTON L. GORDON, A
PANAMA FOREST AND SHORE: NATURAL HISTORY AND AMERINDIAN
CULTURE IN BOCAS DEL TORO 39-40, 152-57 (Boxwood Press, 1982);

Castillero-Calvo supra note 14, at 291-310.
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century. By that time, the Naso territory had been reduced

to encompass only the Lower Teribe and the Upper San
San river watersheds in Panama, as well as an isolated
community in the Southern Pacific of Costa Rica. 40 The
Naso had lost most of their vast historical territory, yet they
had been able to maintain their language and their distinct
form of political organization-a monarchy.
With such a reduced number of people,4 ' and hundreds of kilometers away from Panama City, the Naso
enjoyed de facto autonomy and absolute control of their
ancestral territory during most of the XX century. However, they would eventually be reached by the prolonged
arms of the Torrijos Revolution.42 During the 1970s, the
Teribe-Changuinola watershed was identified as the most
important national reserve for hydropower generation in the
whole country. As a matter of fact, the revolutionary government had planned to develop this area after the completion of the Bayano hydroelectric project. Since the Naso
were also demanding legal recognition of their territory,
once again Omar Torrijos committed himself personally
with King Simeon Santana to grant comarca status to the
Naso lands.43 As Panama fell into political and economic
chaos after the death of Torrijos, the promise of a Naso
comarca, as well as the ambitious plans to build a gigantic
hydroelectric complex in the Teribe-Changuinola, were left
dormant for over a decade. Only after the "economic modernization" of Perez Balladares had begun to appear in the
horizon, were the Naso lands brought back to the memory
of decision-makers in Panama City. As a matter of fact,
40 According to Gordon this group had been relocated by the Franciscan
missionaries in what today is the Costa Rican town of Terraba. Gordon,
supra note 39, at 39.
41Today the Naso number around 3,000 people.
42 Jason Paiement, The Tiger and the Turbine: Indigenous Rights and
Resource Management in the Naso Territory of Panama 64-66 (2007)
(Ph.D. dissertation, McGill University).
43 Personal communication with Adolfo Villagra.
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even before the privatization of the government-owned
electric company, Instituto de Recursos Hidraulicosy Electrificacion (IRHE), a group of local entrepreneurs had
asked the Government of Panama for a concession to construct the first of the dams of the Teribe-Changuinola hydroelectric complex, that would be located on the Bonyic
River, a tributary of the Teribe River.
The return of government plans to exploit the Teribe-Changuinola watershed for hydropower generation
revived the Naso struggle for the creation of a comarca.
Since the Naso had previously rejected the proposal of the
Ngobe to form a single comarca, their collective lands were
not included in Law 10 of 1997. 44 This confronted the
Naso with the difficult challenge of negotiating a comarca
of their own with the national government. The political
tensions associated with the irruption of external actors in
the Naso Territory, from Ngobe colonization to government
aid to the advent of the Bonyic Project, had ruptured the
traditional political organization, creating a rift between45
King Cesar Santana and his nephew Luis Tito Santana.
After many months of internal disputes, Cesar recognized
Tito as the legitimate King. Tito arrived with the promise
that he would achieve the ultimate aspiration of the Naso,
the recognition of their collective lands as a comarca. For
this purpose, Tito recurred to the remnants of the corporatist governing structures that had been left by Torrijos,
perhaps unaware than in this new period of neo-liberal
multiculturalism, the interests of indigenous peoples would
be completely secondary to private investment and national
economic growth.
In 2001, the World Bank approved a loan contract
with the Government of Panama for a countrywide landti-

"Personal communication with Jose Cruz Monico.
45

Paiement, supra note 42, at 133-35.
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tling program. 46 The Land Administration Program (PRONAT) involved the delimitation and demarcation of indigenous lands and protected areas, as a corrective measure to
avoid the privatization of these collective areas by the voracious land market. The World Bank contractors and
associated government bureaucrats expected that the protection of the Naso lands would proceed uneventfully,
without any major hurdles. In fact, in 2003 the limits of the
Naso lands had already been identified and mostly agreed
upon by the Bank consultants, government officials, and
Naso authorities. A few months later, draft legislation
would be proposed to the National Assembly for the declaration of the Naso Tjer-Di Indigenous Comarca. Had unexpected events never occurred, the Naso lands would have
probably been declared a comarca during the presidential
administration of Mireya Moscoso, like had previously
happened with the Wargandi Kuna Comarca in 2000.
However, the unanticipated purchase of the Bonyic concession by the Empresas Publicas de Medellin (EEPPM), a
Colombian utilities company, once again destabilized the
Naso traditional governance structures, and in this case, led
to a crisis of representation that would be much more pronounced, prolonged, and vicious than any previous conflicts in the Teribe River.
In November 2003, several members of the Naso
Council 47 declared that they were opposed to the construction of the Bonyic Project without the creation of the Comarca, and accused King Tito Santana of having been

46

Project Information Document No. PID8082. Panama-Land Ad-

ministration Project (PAPE 0595) (www.worldbank.org).
47 Besides the King, the traditional Naso governance structure is formed
by the Naso Council and the Naso Assembly. The Council is a special
deliberative and advisory body composed of representatives of the
eleven official Naso communities. The Assembly is considered the
highest decision-making body, and is formed by all the Naso people
who are considered adults according to Naso traditional norms.
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bribed by the hydroelectric company. 48 Initially, the Naso
tried to solve this controversy internally, and in February
2004, the different factions had agreed to form an ad hoc
commission to examine the questions of the Comarca and
of the hydroelectric project. Unfortunately, King Tito decided to ignore this agreement, and a few weeks later, he
removed the President of the Naso Council, Adolfo Villagra, and several other prominent Naso leaders from the ad
hoc commission. In response, on May 30, the dissenting
group called for a Naso General Assembly, and announced
the overthrow of King Tito Santana, proclaiming his uncle
Valentin Santana as the new King of the Naso. These
events occurred only a few weeks after Martin Torrijos, the
son of former General Omar Torrijos Herrera, had been
elected as the new President of Panama. Even before the
official transfer of power, however, in June 2004, the National Assembly voted against the law project that created
the Naso Comarca. This congressional decision signaled a
reversal of the previous government policy of protecting
indigenous comarca lands, and suggested that the historical
alliance between the government and indigenous peoples
was finally over.
In spite of the negative signs given by the National
Assembly during the last days of the Moscoso administration, the election of another Torrijos as President raised
incredible expectations among the Naso and many other
indigenous peoples around the country. Before the transfer
of power, the Naso held talks with indigenous leaders associated with the PRD and even agreed on the designation of
the new Director of Indigenous Affairs of the Ministry of
Government and Justice. 49 In addition, a few weeks before
the swearing of the new national government on September
1st, the supporters of both Tito and Valentin Santana
agreed on holding elections within the Naso community to
48

Paiement, supranote 42, at 135-43.

49 Personal communication with Felix Sanchez.
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solve the existing crisis of legitimacy. They expected that
the new PRD authorities would certify the winner of these
elections, a mechanism that had proven successful during
the previous controversy between Cesar and Tito Santana.
During the first months of the Torrijos administration, the followers of Valentin Santana invited the national
authorities to mediate in the Naso governing crisis. 50 As
opposed to the very personal style of the late Omar Torrijos, these communications were never responded by the
PRD bureaucracy. The supporters of Valentin Santana did
not actually realize that the new administration had thrown
its lots in favor of Tito Santana and the Colombian company until the month of December. Then, the Deputy Minister of Commerce, and the Deputy Minister of
Government and Justice, both participated in a public
ceremony in the town of Changuinola to sign the compensation agreement between Tito Santana and EEPPM for the
construction of the Bonyic Project. Confronted with such a
betrayal by the same PRD party that they had trusted for
several decades, the Naso leaders reclaimed their de facto
autonomy regime, and forcefully expelled Tito Santana
from the Naso Territory on January 5, 2005.
During the next months, government officials from
the Ministry of Government and Justice finally began organizing elections within the Naso Territory.51 However,
these conversations stalled over the specific provisions of
the electoral statute. Whereas supporters of Valentin Santana demanded the use of the same rules that had governed
the election of Tito Santana, government bureaucrats insisted on the implementation of a new statute that would
prevent several supporters of Valentin from participating in
the elections, particularly young people under eighteen
years. When no agreement was reached after several weeks
of negotiations, the supporters of Valentin Santana decided
50 Id.; Paiement,

supra note 42, at 151-52.

51Paiement, supra note 42, at 156-59.
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to boycott the elections since they considered that these
elections were in violation of Naso customary law (usos y
costumbres). As a result, on April 3rd, Tito Santana was
reelected as King of the Naso running as a sole candidate,
although with less than half of the voting population that
was included in the electoral list that had provoked the
controversy.
Since the elections did not solve, but aggravated the
Naso conflict, the contours of the neo-liberal multicultural
State that had replaced the Torrijos corporatist model finally became entirely visible. When the followers of Tito
Santana tried to occupy the Naso government headquarters
in the community of Siey Llik, around twenty heavily
armed police units were dispatched into the Teribe River by
the national government to uphold this operation. 52 Reminiscent of Omar Torrijos Herrera forty years before, the
police officer that was responsible for the armed contingent
decided to dialogue with the Naso leaders and refused to
forcibly evict the supporters of Valentin from the Naso
government seat. As a result, the official inauguration of
Tito Santana occurred in the backyard of a house located
along the Teribe River, after which the "King," his Council
and the accompanying government delegation all traveled
back to his place of exile outside the Naso Territory. Although the Police had refused to exercise the state monopoly over the legitimate use of force, the neo-liberal
multicultural State of the 2000s had demonstrated that in
this struggle for power, the government was not willing to
tolerate those indigenous leaders who challenged the sovereignty of the State, and instead would support leaders like
Tito Santana who were subservient to the demands of international capital and government-defined national interests.
Although the supporters of Valentin Santana had
appealed to those regulatory institutions that had been es52

Paiement, supra note 42, at 160-62.
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tablished by the Perez Balladares administration as formal
mechanisms to defend citizen rights within a neo-liberal
state model; neither the Ombudsman Office nor the Public
Services Regulatory Entity (ERSP) nor the National Environmental Authority (ANAM) were capable of representing
the interests of the Naso as if they were equal citizens within a neo-liberal State, let alone protecting any special minority rights within a multicultural framework.
The
Ombudsman Office visited the Naso Territory and provided
assistance for the peaceful resolution of the conflict during
early 2004; yet when the controversy escalated, this Office
did not have any effective means to protect citizen rights
and/or special minority rights. The ERSP, that was created
with the purpose of regulating public utilities, did not have
any mandate to mediate in conflicts between private companies and people affected by development projects. And
finally, the National Environmental Authority (ANAM)
that could have rejected the Environmental Impact Assessment of the Bonyic Project, that was planned to be constructed within the Palo Seco protected area, 53 preferred to
ignore the demands of the hundreds of Naso who traveled
to the town of Changuinola to participate in the public
hearing of the Project in June 2005. As the State no longer
provided the corporatist means of participation that characterized the former Torrijos period; and yet did not implement neither equal citizen rights (neo-liberal) nor special
indigenous rights (multicultural); the Naso leaders threatened to renounce en masse to the party that they had supported for so many years, the Revolutionary Democratic
53 The Naso Territory overlaps with two nationally protected areas, the
Palo Seco Forest Preserve and the La Amistad International Park (PILA). Both of these areas are part of the internationally-recognized La

Amistad Biosphere Reserve. The Bonyic hydroelectric project was
planned to be constructed within the boundaries of Palo Seco, and
according to environmentalists, this Project would also affect the ecosystems of the La Amistad International Park, which is also a UNESCO
World Heritage Site.
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Party (PRD) of General Omar Torrijos and of his son, current President Martin Torrijos.
In 2005, the Naso expressed their opposition to the
imposition of a King and of a hydroelectric project by the
same neo-liberal multicultural State that had rejected the
creation of their comarca a year before. This tense situation could have escalated into more direct and serious confrontations had the international regime of multicultural
citizenship rights not intervened to stifle the conflict. In
July, and after several months of discussions, the Private
Sector of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
decided to stop considering for financing the Bonyic Hydroelectric Project. 54 The withdrawal of the Bank represented an unforeseen victory for the followers of Valentin
Santana, and an unanticipated defeat for Tito, the national
government and the Colombian company. 55 Facing an
unresponsive neo-liberal multicultural State, the Naso had
sought for accountability and the recognition of their special rights as indigenous peoples at the international level.56
As the Ngobe widow Isabel Becker inadvertently continued
tendering her cacao groves, the dark cloud that was looming over the heads of the last surviving Naso migrated
northeast to the Ngobe Territory in the neighboring Changuinola River. As the thrust of capitalist development
forbade the explicit recognition of the Naso defacto regime
of political autonomy; the Ngobe, who had successfully
Letter fromRobert Montgomery of the Inter-American Development
Bank (IADB) to Osvaldo Jordan (Alianza para la Conservacion y el
Desarrollo), Aaron Goldzimer (Environmental Defense), and Jose
Yunis (Natural Resources Defense Council).
55 Paiement, supra note 42, at 163-67.
56 For a general discussion about transnational advocacy networks, see
54

MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); for a

discussion of the special policies of international banks towards indigenous peoples and environmental conservation, see also Fox & BROWN,
supra note 8, BRYSK, supra note 8 (for current discussions about the
internationalization of indigenous struggles).
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mobilized against the Teribe-Changuinola hydroelectric
complex in the early 1980s and had been granted their
comarca status in 1997, were expected to pay back for this
favor to the successors of Omar Torrijos.
VII.

Teribe-Changuinola ten years after the Comarca: Redefining the Ngobe Struggle for
Territorial Rights

"We are against the neocolonialism of the transnational
corporations that try to destabilize politically and create
complications in the economic life of the country, when
they are confronted with the legitimate demands
of the
57
Sovereign in defense of its natural resources,"
According to an unofficial story told repeatedly by
Ngobe grassroots leaders, the Ngobe of Valle de Risco in
the District of Changuinola rejected the proposal to belong
to the Ngobe-Bugle Indigenous Comarca when Law 10 of
1997 was finally drafted by the Perez Balladares administration. The position of the Ngobe of Valle de Risco angered many of the other Ngobe leaders that were struggling
for their territorial rights, yet Valle de Risco and several
other communities in the Changuinola and Bocas del Toro
districts in the Province of Bocas del Toro were granted a
special status as annex areas of the Comarca.58 In spite of
the decision allegedly made by the inhabitants of Valle de
Risco and of the other annex areas to part away from the
rest of the Ngobe people, several Changuinola leaders have
occupied very prominent positions in the now institutional-

57Omar Torrijos Herrera, Respuestas a Garcia Marquez, Ediciones,

Reforma Educativa, Panama (1975) (cited in Jose de Jesus Martinez,
Ideario Omar Torrijos, 113 (Osvaldo Jordan trans., Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana. 1982)).
58 Law 10 of 1997, Article 4; Law 69 of 1998, Article 8; Executive
Decree 194 of 1999, Articles 12-14.
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ized Ngobe-Bugle governing structure. 59 Loyal to the legacy of Omar Torrijos, most of them were members of the
PRD; and like the Naso of the neighboring Teribe watershed, they also expected that the government of Martin
Torrijos would favor the interests of indigenous peoples, as
was vociferously proclaimed by his father and by other
important PRD figures in the Province of Bocas del Toro.
As a matter of fact, shortly after the transfer of power,
several Ngobe leaders of Changuinola were assigned to key
positions in the regional government bureaucracy, including the regional administrator of ANAM, Ngobe leader
Valentin Pineda from Valle de Risco.
When a small company, Hydroteribe, S. A., organized the public hearings for the environmental impact assessments (EJAs) of three hydroelectric projects proposed
in the main stem of the Changuinola River in the vicinity of
Valle de Risco (Chan 75, Chan 140 and Chan 220); the
Ngobe leadership was confronted with the same conflict of
interests that had haunted a whole generation of indigenous
leaders after the approval of Law 10 of 1997. Most of the
people directly affected by the projects, including the
Ngobe widow Isabel Becker, never attended the public
hearings, and were completely unaware of the implications
of these projects that were presented by chui who spoke the
language of the Conquest. Another group of more politically active Ngobe leaders had already organized gatherings to oppose the projects since October 2004. Yet, there
was also a critical sector of the Ngobe leadership that remained committed to what was sold as a "state" project,
and who envisioned the benefits that would be provided for
'9 Law 10 of 1997 provided for the creation of several official positions
at the Comarca level, such as the Governor, caciques, congress presidents and council coordinators. Besides, international cooperation also
produced important salaried positions that were usually occupied by
Ngobe with strong political connections.
60 The word chui refers to non-indigenous people, especially mixedblood mestizos.
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"the poor" by such an outpour of financial investment.
Regardless of these internal divisions, the three hydroelectric projects appeared to be a fantasy until ANAM approved the EIAs in October 2005. A few months later, a
major North American corporation, Allied Energy Services
(AES) from Arlington, Virginia, would claim ownership of
the three hydroelectric projects, and would walk hand in
hand with government officials, including Ngobe leaders,
to promise benefits that would surpass any of the early
utopias of General Omar Torrijos.
From the beginning, the Changuinola projects suffered from a pathology that would only be imaginable in
the context of the persistent memory of Omar Torrijos
among the indigenous population: They were sold simultaneously as government-sponsored state projects in the same
corporatist tradition of the 1970s, but also as private initiatives originating from neo-liberal economic modernization.
As the former category, the projects should be supported
wholeheartedly by the government bureaucracy, including
the Ngobe leaders, and by the local communities, in the
same way that the Kuna and the Embera had relinquished

their ancestral lands for the welfare of the nation during the
construction of Bayano Project in the 1970s. However, as
purely private initiatives, the State was not responsible for
any compensations or liability negotiations, and government institutions would only be limited to a minimal regulation of private corporations according to the Perez
Balladares institutional reforms of the mid-1990s. As AES
moved decisively into the Changuinola River, and visited
the Ngobe communities with gifts and monetary offerings
of all sorts, many of the indigenous leaders that were previously opposed to the hydroelectric projects began working
for the Company; or receiving contracts for their lands,
their houses, and other kinds of services. The internal division of the Ngobe population reached its zenith in the Valle
de Risco gathering of May 2006, in which those who supported the hydroelectric projects were denied the opportu-
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nity to participate in the meeting
by those who opposed
61
hydroelectric development.
The Valle Risco gathering also marked the irruption
of the neo-liberal multicultural State into the Changuinola
conflict. In this meeting, the people opposed to the projects
announced a series of demonstrations in the dam sites (including Bonyic) on June 5, World Environment Day. A
few days before this date, however, the Government deployed police forces all around the Changuinola District,
searching for specific Naso and Ngobe leaders; and cordoned off the entrances to the communities of Valle de
Risco and Nance de Risco to control access to the dam
sites. 62 Although these government abuses were denounced
to the Ombudsman Office, there has never been any official
pronouncement about these irregular activities. During the
coming months, AES began negotiating individually the
relocations for an estimated 100 families that would be
"directly" affected by the Chan 75 reservoir, without the
63
official participation of any government institution.
However, local government officials, including several
Ngobe leaders, participated in the public events organized
by the Company, signaling that the projects had the blessing of the government as if they were state business.
According to Isabel Becker, on January 3, 2007, she
and several of her family members were transported by
AES representatives to Panama City for a tour of the capi61 Officially,

the Valle Risco meeting was also expected to be attended
by Naso and Bribri leaders, and was therefore called Naso-NgobeBribri Congress. The Bribri is a different ethnic group that also lives in
the Changuinola District between the Naso Territory and the Costa
Rican border.
62 Personal communication with Felix Sanchez and Pedro Abrego.
63 The ANAM resolutions approving the environmental impact assessments for the three projects established that Chan 75 should be constructed before Chan 140 and Chan 220. The number of people
affected by the Chan 75 project has never been officially determined,
and AES only takes into consideration the communities of Changuinola
Arriba, Guayabal, Valle Rey, and Charco de La Pava.
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tal. After some shopping in the morning, however, they
were all taken to the headquarters of AES, where the widow Isabel, who does not speak Spanish and does not know
how to read and write in any language, was asked to sign
an agreement conceding her lands to the hydroelectric
company. As Isabel struggled against her inevitable destiny, many hours passed before she finally accepted to print
her thumb into a document that she could not understand.
Many days later, Isabel would refuse to abide to this
agreement, when AES employees insisted that she needed
to leave her place for safety reasons. During this prolonged
stalemate, no government institution assumed any responsibility for the plight of Isabel, as well as of hundreds of
other Ngobe who were being pressured to renounce to their
land rights; not even the regional head of ANAM, Valentin
Pineda, who supervised the nationally protected area in
which Isabel lived and where the hydroelectric project was
planned to be constructed.64 Ironically, according to several community leaders, the Palo Seco Forest Preserve was
the main reason that most Ngobe of the Changuinola River
Watershed had been denied the opportunity to register their
land rights years before. They had been told that they were
living within a protected area.
The drama of Isabel grew increasingly tense, as the
company maintained that she had to leave her property.
Changuinola Mayor, Virginia Abrego, also an Ngobe, intervened in the controversy, at some point even holding
Isabel against her will in her "new house" in the town of
64 The Chan 75, Chan 140 and Chan 220 hydroelectric projects are also

located in the Palo Seco Forest Preserve. Like in Bonyic, environmental organizations argue that these projects will not only affect this
reserve, but the La Amistad International Park (PILA), a World Heritage Site that protects the headwaters of the Changuinola River. In
spite of this argument, in May 2007, ANAM signed a contract with
AES granting an administrative concession of 6,215 Hectares of the
Palo Seco Forest for the construction of the Chan 75 hydroelectric
project.
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Changuinola. 65 Between July and October, many other
government officials visited the widow, claiming that they
represented the government and that Chan 75 needed to be
constructed for her own welfare and for that of the rest of
the country. In contrast with the Kuna and the Embera
during the Torrijos years, no community meetings were
ever held to discuss the relocation plans, and no public
negotiations ever occurred between the government and the
affected communities. 66 The Ombudsman Office did visit
the area in several occasions, but never took any commitment to act on behalf of Isabel or of any other of the Ngobe
residents of the Changuinola River. The Ombudsman officials withheld the claims of the Company that this was an
entirely private transaction between an illiterate Ngobe
widow, who did not speak Spanish, and a multinational
corporation based in the vicinity of Washington, D. C.
After many months of continued harassment and of unrelenting suffering, on October 19, Isabel finally accepted to
print her thumb into a new agreement that like the previous
document, she did not understand. Less than a week later,
she would be escorted away from her farm by the National
Police, while AES executives and government officials
gloriously celebrated the inauguration of the construction
of the Chan 75 project in a nearby location. On October
19, the National Public Services Authority (ASEP), the
65

That same day, July 21, 2007, a bulldozer had stormed into Isabel's

property. From the impression, she had fainted, and municipal authorities had taken her to the town of Changuinola supposedly for medical
attention. After she left the physician, she was carried to a house in the
outskirts of Changuinola that had been acquired by AES for her temporary relocation. After crying for the whole night, she was finally taken
back to her house in the Changuinola River on the following day.
66 The ANAM meetings held in August and November 2007 limited
themselves to presenting the relocation plans that had been proposed by
AES and allegedly revised by ANAM. The Company always maintained that compensation agreements should be negotiated individually,
and not collectively. See Cultural Survival Quarterly, Winter 2007
(detailing a complete report about the November meeting).
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successor of the Public Services Regulatory Entity (ERSP),

had issued resolution AN 1228-Elec, declaring
the Chan67
guinola projects of public and social interest.
In contrast with the Naso relentless opposition to
the same governing party that had allied itself with indigenous peoples in the 1970s, the Ngobe leadership had succumbed to a combination of government offerings, private
enticements, and direct coercion. The same government
that had promised to protect the indigenous lands as comarcas under the Torrijos model of corporatist citizenship
had now demanded the continued loyalty of indigenous
peoples, even when government officials negotiated their
collective lands with private corporations. The Chan 75
hydroelectric project, and the tragedy of Isabel Becker,
revealed the monstrosity of the neo-liberal multicultural
citizenship regime that had been adopted by the Panamanian State in the 1990s. Special indigenous rights and
universal human rights would only be respected in the
boutique fashion described by Stanley Fish (1997). Indigenous peoples would indeed make excellent characters for
postcards and multicultural displays. Yet, confronted with
the contradictory national/private interest of business and
government, the institutional mechanisms established by
Perez Balladares to regulate private investment and protect
citizen rights would be rendered completely ineffective,
and the collective land rights of indigenous peoples would
have to be relinquished peacefully to the lures of money, or
forcibly to the batons of the National Police.

67 Law

10 of 2006 had restructured the Public Services Regulatory
Entity (ERSP) into the National Public Services Authority (ASEP).
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VIII. Rolling back the State: Neo-liberal Multicultural Citizenship and the Disempowerment of
Indigenous Peoples in Globalizing Panama
The cases of the Naso and of the Ngobe of Western
Panama illustrate the profound transformations that have
been happening in the relations between indigenous peoples and national governments after the process of neoliberal state reform and structural adjustment. For many
authors, these dislocations provided an impetus for the
increasing mobilization of indigenous peoples in the 1990s,
and for constitutional reforms that incorporated notions of
multicultural citizenship. 68 In spite of the significance of a
"politics of recognition," however, the adoption of models
of neo-liberal multicultural citizenship ultimately concealed
the power inequalities that existed between indigenous
peoples and other political actors, like multinational corporations. 69 Such a deceiving attempt at recognizing without
empowering can be complicated by two aggravating situations that proved tragic in the two cases described above.
First, the symbolic persistence of notions of corporatist
citizenship even during those situations in which the legal
framework and the political praxis denounced the existence
of a completely different playing field, the transition from
the welfare state of the 1970s to the neo-liberal regimes of
the 1990s. Initially, the Naso tried to recur to the corporatist structures of the 1970s, but when they felt betrayed by
the PRD government, they reclaimed the defacto regime of
political autonomy that had allowed them to survive
through centuries of ethnic wars, Catholic evangelization,
and the encroachment of international capitalism. In con68 COTT,
YASHAR,
69 See

supra note 3, at 1-35 (2000); Assies, supra note 3, at 9-16;

supra note 3, at 54-82 (2005).

generally Hale, supra note 10, at 485-524 (2002); Gerardo

Otero, Global Economy, Local Politics:Indigenous Struggles, Civil
Society, and Democracy, CANADIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

37 (2): 325-347 (2004);

DIAZ-POLANCO,

supra note 10, at32-56.
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trast, the Ngobe leaders of the District of Changuinola
preferred to ally with the governing party, even when that
implied abandoning a grandmother like Isabel Becker,
leaving her alone to fight against forces that she could not
even comprehend.
In addition to the persistence of corporatist loyalties, the collapse of those institutions that had been created
by the neo-liberal state to equilibrate the power of business
and citizens left indigenous peoples vulnerable to the temptations of capitalism and to the violence of a State that was
simultaneously absent and omnipresent. The dispatch of
police forces to the Naso Territory was only the prelude to
the outright occupation of the neighboring Ngobe Territory
a year later. Whereas state officials did not acknowledge
any responsibility in the process of relocation of Chan 75,
they actively participated in the siege of Isabel Becker,
arguing that the project was important for her own benefit
and for that of the "nation." The Office of the Ombudsman
proved completely ineffective in both cases. The National
Environmental Authority (ANAM) essentially delivered the
management of the Palo Seco Forest Preserve to AES, and
ignored the claims of the hundreds of Naso who traveled to
the town of Changuinola to express their opposition against
the construction of the Bonyic hydroelectric project in
2005. The Public Services Regulatory Entity (ERSP) never
intervened on behalf of the people affected by the hydroelectric projects, and instead issued a resolution upholding
the continuation of the Chan 75 project even after the case
of Isabel Becker had become known in the media nationally and internationally.
In Panama, the prospects for indigenous peoples
under a neo-liberal multicultural citizenship regime are
completely dismal. Not only are the corporatist mechanisms of popular participation of the former Torrijos years
no longer available, but in these times of a new and younger Torrijos, indigenous peoples have also been denied the
possibility of equal citizenship rights or of special multicul-
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tural provisions beyond the mere recognition of cultural
difference and boutique expressions of uniqueness. Under
these circumstances, indigenous peoples were only left with
the collective titles that they had obtained during the period
of corporatist citizenship, with the uncertain possibility of
reaching to the international regime of multicultural citizenship, or with the alternative of recurring to their preexisting regimes of defacto political autonomy. Yet, even
these persistent spaces of autonomy are also increasingly
under siege as the tentacles of private business and government bureaucracies extend into the comarca lands themselves. 70 The Naso decided to reclaim their de facto
political autonomy in January 2005, following the examples of the Lacandon Mayas in 1994, the Ngobe in 1964,
and the Kunas in 1925. Yet, the question still remains of
how long would the neo-liberal multicultural State tolerate
these challenges to its purported national sovereignty, and
when would they respond using what Weber avidly defined
as the monopoly over the legitimate use of force. Isabel
Becker did not wait for this dreadful moment, and walking
over the footprints of millions of indigenous women in
countless places and endless times in history, she chose a
dignifying exit of her beloved homeland, as opposed to the
stoic voicing of her complains, or the humiliating loyalty of
the Ngobe bureaucrats of the governing party. Since there
is no place for her in the Panama of skyscrapers, beach
resorts and expanded waterways, she would rather abandon
her lands than betraying her ancestors for the rewards of
private payoffs or government positions.

In 2006, a group of North American speculators obtained a concession over the whole Caribbean Coast of the Ngobe-Bugle Indigenous
Comarca. As the Damani Beach Project created divisions even among
those Ngobe leaders loyal to the PRD, this dreadful precedent sent
warning signs that indigenous collective lands were not safe even
within the limits of the comarcas.
70
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Epilogue
In November 2007, seven Naso protestors were
detained in the Teribe River as they blockaded the advance
of the machinery of the Empresas Publicas de Medellin
(EEPPM). The Company had obtained financing for the
continuation of the Bonyic hydroelectric project, yet the
Naso continued defending their de facto regime of political
autonomy. In February 2008, seven other people were
taken to jail for the same reason, and between April and
September, there were several violent confrontations between the followers of Tito Santana and Valentin Santana
over the continuation of the Bonyic Project.
In December 2007, hundreds of Ngobe protestors
occupied the property that had belonged to the Ngobe widow Isabel Becker to stall the continuation of the Chan 75
hydroelectric project. On January 3, they were violently
repressed by the National Police that persecuted protest
organizers into the neighboring communities and in the
mountains of the La Amistad Biosphere Reserve. After
that date, the Chan 75 area has been permanently occupied
by the Police, controlling access to the communities and
escorting AES machinery to work on any Ngobe family
property, even against the will of the rightful owners of that
land. On March 7, 2008, Alianza para la Conservacion y el
Desarrollo (ACD) and Cultural Survival presented a petition to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission
(IAHRC) for the protection of the human rights of the
Ngobe population of the Changuinola River. As this paper
was finished, AES continued building the hydroelectric
project a few meters away and against the opposition of the
Ngobe residents of Charco de La Pava. When an AES
employee asked Ana Castillo, the only daughter of Isabel
Becker to have remained in the community, to leave her
house, she said that "she did not want money, but to live in
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her land, that her grandparents had lived in these lands, that
she will7 never go and that she will always protect her
house." 1

71

Declarations of Ana Castillo taken by human rights lawyer Karine

Rinaldi between September 27-28, 2008.
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